arXiv:1708.09537cs.CR
DolphinAtack: Inaudible Voice Commands
Abstract
Speech recognition (SR) systems such as Siri or Google Now have become an increasingly popular human-computer interaction method, and have turned various systems into voice controllable systems(VCS). Prior work on attacking VCS shows that the hidden voice commands that are incomprehensible to people can control the systems. Hidden voice commands, though hidden, are nonetheless audible. In this work, we design a completely inaudible attack, DolphinAttack, that modulates voice commands on ultrasonic carriers (e.g., f > 20 kHz) to achieve inaudibility. By leveraging the nonlinearity of the microphone circuits, the modulated low frequency audio commands can be successfully demodulated, recovered, and more importantly interpreted by the speech recognition systems. We validate DolphinAttack on popular speech recognition systems, including Siri, Google Now, Samsung S Voice, Huawei HiVoice, Cortana and Alexa. By injecting a sequence of inaudible voice commands, we show a few proof-of-concept attacks, which include activating Siri to initiate a FaceTime call on iPhone, activating Google Now to switch the phone to the airplane mode, and even manipulating the navigation system in an Audi automobile. We propose hardware and software defense solutions. We validate that it is feasible to detect DolphinAttack by classifying the audios using supported vector machine (SVM), and suggest to re-design voice controllable systems to be resilient to inaudible voice command attacks.
Filter won’t necessarily help. It’s possible to use ultra sonic for amplitude modulation signal to affect the non linearity of a microphone itself. [0] Although it does require knowing what the underlying natural sound to be modulated is (some processing required). Robustness to…
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Dolphin Attack used ultrasonic amplitude modulation against a variety of devices with some success [0]. Page 9 for the results table. I believe they were taking advantage of the non linearity of microphones. 0: https://arxiv.org/pdf/1708.09537.pdf
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