HackerPapers

arXiv:1703.02874cs.CR

A Study of MAC Address Randomization in Mobile Devices and When it Fails

Jeremy Martin, Travis Mayberry, Collin Donahue, Lucas Foppe, Lamont Brown, Chadwick Riggins, Erik C. Rye, Dane Brown

Abstract

MAC address randomization is a privacy technique whereby mobile devices rotate through random hardware addresses in order to prevent observers from singling out their traffic or physical location from other nearby devices. Adoption of this technology, however, has been sporadic and varied across device manufacturers. In this paper, we present the first wide-scale study of MAC address randomization in the wild, including a detailed breakdown of different randomization techniques by operating system, manufacturer, and model of device. We then identify multiple flaws in these implementations which can be exploited to defeat randomization as performed by existing devices. First, we show that devices commonly make improper use of randomization by sending wireless frames with the true, global address when they should be using a randomized address. We move on to extend the passive identification techniques of Vanhoef et al. to effectively defeat randomization in ~96% of Android phones. Finally, we show a method that can be used to track 100% of devices using randomization, regardless of manufacturer, by exploiting a previously unknown flaw in the way existing wireless chipsets handle low-level control frames.

arXiv comments
Journal reference
DOI
Subjects
cs.CRCryptography and Security

On Hacker News

Linked by 7 identifiable commenters in 7 comments across 7 threads, from Aug 2017 to Jan 2019. Found in 6 HN submissions from Mar 2017 to Aug 2024. Open submission discussions.

Comments linking this paper, per year.

Discussed in comments7 threads

    • On probe requests this can be very often(< second or within 50 frames), especially in the case of IOS. On Android MAC randomisation is implemented only on a handful of specific devices and some vendors dont at all. Mac randomisation is flawed at the least and can still be used…

      cjnichollsView on HNParent context

    • Confirmed, however there are/were flaws in MAC randomization, see A Study of MAC Address Randomization in Mobile Devices and When it Fails https://arxiv.org/abs/1703.02874v1. Has it been addressed somehow recently?

      imhoguyView on HNParent context

    • Two other issues I'm worried about with iOS: - MAC address tracking (RTS packets thrwart MAC randomization[0], not immediately clear if WiFi is fully off[1]) - All-or-nothing access to photos on the phone (append-only for apps that request it) Discord in particular is bad for…

      thisacctforrealView on HNParent context

    • The only source for this a could find was an old paper on iOS 8, while this more recent one https://arxiv.org/pdf/1703.02874.pdf seems to suggest the randomisation works as intended for unknown networks...

      Sephiroth87View on HNParent context

    • There are further examples that Apple takes privacy seriously: 1) end-to-end encryption of all iMessages 2) encrypted iCloud content 3) making password management accessible to a lot of people who would not pursue it otherwise (with Keychain) 4) attempting MAC address…

      doctorsherView on HNParent context

    • I'm just now learning about all this (I'd heard about stores tracking customers, but thought it only worked with Wifi enabled), but it seems many Android phones don't actually do randomization, and it can be easily fingerprinted even if they do. From a 2017 paper…

      squeaky-cleanView on HNParent context

Submitted to Hacker News

Connected through shared HN threads, not inferred similarity or a recommendation.