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arXiv:1703.00536cs.CR

The Loopix Anonymity System

Ania Piotrowska, Jamie Hayes, Tariq Elahi, Sebastian Meiser, George Danezis

Early discovery. Linked by one identifiable commenter. This paper is outside the main ranking; a mention is not an endorsement.

Abstract

We present Loopix, a low-latency anonymous communication system that provides bi-directional 'third-party' sender and receiver anonymity and unobservability. Loopix leverages cover traffic and brief message delays to provide anonymity and achieve traffic analysis resistance, including against a global network adversary. Mixes and clients self-monitor the network via loops of traffic to provide protection against active attacks, and inject cover traffic to provide stronger anonymity and a measure of sender and receiver unobservability. Service providers mediate access in and out of a stratified network of Poisson mix nodes to facilitate accounting and off-line message reception, as well as to keep the number of links in the system low, and to concentrate cover traffic. We provide a theoretical analysis of the Poisson mixing strategy as well as an empirical evaluation of the anonymity provided by the protocol and a functional implementation that we analyze in terms of scalability by running it on AWS EC2. We show that a Loopix relay can handle upwards of 300 messages per second, at a small delay overhead of less than 1.5 ms on top of the delays introduced into messages to provide security. Overall message latency is in the order of seconds - which is low for a mix-system. Furthermore, many mix nodes can be securely added to a stratified topology to scale throughput without sacrificing anonymity.

arXiv comments
Journal reference
DOI
Subjects
cs.CRCryptography and Security

On Hacker News

Linked by 1 identifiable commenter in 4 comments across 3 threads, from Sep 2021 to Jan 2022.

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Discussed in comments3 threads

    • One idea that I am fond of is Nym, an implementation of the high-latency mix network Loopix[0], but with incentives for nodes to act as mixnodes and message providers, using a model in which users pay nodes for their bandwidth. The goal being to provide strong anonymity in the…

      sweetbitterView on HNParent context

    • Loopix - https://arxiv.org/abs/1703.00536 Nym (Loopix but using blockchain for users to pay nodes) - https://nymtech.net/nym-whitepaper.pdf https://nymtech.net/

      sweetbitterView on HNParent context

    • Basically, you want to run a messaging service over an onion routing network (Tor, I2P), or even better, a mix network. You should check out Nym (https://nymtech.net/) and come back with what you think about it. It is very suitable to what you want, and Loopix is resistant to…

      sweetbitterView on HNParent context

    • "Trusting mathematics" would be a much more accurate claim if we were talking about mix networks, such as Loopix (https://arxiv.org/abs/1703.00536). But Tor is vulnerable to confirmation attacks to varying degrees, (depending on whether you are accessing clearnet or not, of…

      sweetbitterView on HNParent context

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