Malware Guard Extension: Using SGX to Conceal Cache Attacks · HackerPapers discussions

Malware Guard Extension: Using SGX to Conceal Cache Attacks — mentioned by ChrisLomont

Wed, 15 Jun 2022 11:28:41 GMT

> Constant time" in cryptography means that there is no information flow from secrets to timings If "constant time" cryptography were achievable don't you think we'd have it and there'd be no more timing attacks breaking encryption schemes? "Constant time" cryptography is a mathematical abstraction, a goal, like "unbreakable cipher" and "unbreakable hash" and "frictionless surface." They don't occur in practice. This article breaks itself breaks a "constant time" cryptography with a timing attack. The problem is, as this paper demonstrates (along with many others) coding up a constant time…

Paper and discussion history. A mention is not an endorsement.

Malware Guard Extension: Using SGX to Conceal Cache Attacks — mentioned by Confiks

Thu, 03 May 2018 19:56:22 GMT

"Confidential computing" might seem to refer to homomorphic encryption, but has nothing to do with it in its usage here. After searching around a bit, I suspect that Microsoft Azure first used it in 2017 to refer to code running within a trusted enclave. It looks to me that while Asylo is agnostic about the specific TEE used, it is primarily targeted at Intel SGX [1]. Instead of having to trust Google to run your code correctly and not read your data, you'd have to trust Intel to manufacture a secure enclave and essentially bake in a private key that cannot be read. You could use the public…

Paper and discussion history. A mention is not an endorsement.

Malware Guard Extension: Using SGX to Conceal Cache Attacks — mentioned by j_s

Thu, 30 Mar 2017 17:41:54 GMT

Yes it was specifically called out in someone's tweet I'm trying to find but I believe this was mentioned in the paper. Edit: My mix-up on the paper! Malware Guard Extension: Using SGX to Conceal Cache Attacks (Extended Version) | https://arxiv.org/pdf/1702.08719.pdf (2017) Recently, Intel introduced an instruction set extension called CAT (cache allocation technology) [51]. With Intel CAT it is possible to restrict CPU cores to one of the slices of the last-level cache and even to pin cache lines. Liu et al. [83] proposed a system that uses CAT to protect general purpose software and…

Paper and discussion history. A mention is not an endorsement.

Malware Guard Extension: Using SGX to Conceal Cache Attacks — mentioned by wfn

Sat, 18 Mar 2017 11:57:44 GMT

> seeing cracks that allows a virtualised system to break out to the is scary Hate to break this to you, but it's been shown time and time again that due to how caching and CPU pipelining works in modern processors, any "isolation" including full-on VM which is not "physical isolation" is leaky: https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/e544/00824814fed2ef52bb8415... (overview of attacks) Here is a particularly nice paper (proper methodology, well-explained intro, etc.) showing one example (a more or less regular cache timing attack, but with actual private info extraction from host, etc.)…

Paper and discussion history. A mention is not an endorsement.

Malware Guard Extension: Using SGX to Conceal Cache Attacks — HN submission

Sat, 11 Mar 2017 23:08:37 GMT

Malware Guard Extension: Using SGX to Conceal Cache Attacks

1 point; 0 discussion replies on HN. Paper and source history. A submission is not an endorsement.

Malware Guard Extension: Using SGX to Conceal Cache Attacks — HN submission

Mon, 06 Mar 2017 19:49:31 GMT

Malware Guard Extension: Using SGX to Conceal Cache Attacks

2 points; 0 discussion replies on HN. Paper and source history. A submission is not an endorsement.