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<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Algorand · HackerPapers discussions</title><link>https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1607.01341/</link><description>Collected HN comments and submissions linking this paper.</description><language>en</language><lastBuildDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 11:16:22 GMT</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1607.01341/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" /><item><title>Algorand — mentioned by josh2600</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=24819004</link><guid isPermaLink="false">urn:hackerpapers:mention:1607.01341:24819004</guid><pubDate>Sun, 18 Oct 2020 16:30:29 GMT</pubDate><description>&lt;p&gt;I mean you can just read Silvio’s paper: https://arxiv.org/abs/1607.01341 My understanding on how the accounts are chosen is that they have a global list of users that have opted in to validate and they pick one person at random to create the block and then 1000 people at random to validate it. If you get 501 validations back, then you have a block. The attack I always thought about but never got an answer to was: what if you pay for the lottery winners to collude? Certainly if you offer some amount of money for the block producers only on the condition that you get 501+the block creator in a…&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1607.01341/"&gt;Paper and discussion history&lt;/a&gt;. A mention is not an endorsement.&lt;/p&gt;</description><category>cs.CR</category></item><item><title>Algorand — mentioned by alistproducer2</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=16127312</link><guid isPermaLink="false">urn:hackerpapers:mention:1607.01341:16127312</guid><pubDate>Thu, 11 Jan 2018 20:06:32 GMT</pubDate><description>&lt;p&gt;In distributed ledgers, it doesn&amp;#x27;t matter who the leader is. The system only has to ensure that leadership is distributed in such a way that it is statistically infeasible or economically unprofitable to rewrite history. PoW distributes the leadership (block creation) via crypto puzzles. PoS tries to use economic incentives to make bad behavior more expensive than good. There&amp;#x27;s work being done (which I personally believe is the right way to go) in using a leader election-based system that works like a lottery (Algorand[0] is an example). The basis of such a system is going to be the creation…&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1607.01341/"&gt;Paper and discussion history&lt;/a&gt;. A mention is not an endorsement.&lt;/p&gt;</description><category>cs.CR</category></item><item><title>Algorand — mentioned by peercoin</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=14756578</link><guid isPermaLink="false">urn:hackerpapers:mention:1607.01341:14756578</guid><pubDate>Wed, 12 Jul 2017 20:53:52 GMT</pubDate><description>&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt;An honest mining majority is a hard requirement of Bitcoin. But proof-of-stake doesn&amp;#x27;t solve the problem of collusion -- it&amp;#x27;s even more susceptible to it since it&amp;#x27;s so easy to recreate valid-looking chains. With Bitcoin, two or more competing chains will at least be visible (two distinct chains with a lot of work), whereas they&amp;#x27;re everywhere in PoS and the main chain is qualitatively no different from any other valid chain (of which we can create thousands quickly). I&amp;#x27;m not sure what math you are using to base this assumption on. A formal argument by algorand is that the probability of a…&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1607.01341/"&gt;Paper and discussion history&lt;/a&gt;. A mention is not an endorsement.&lt;/p&gt;</description><category>cs.CR</category></item><item><title>Algorand — mentioned by peercoin</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=14755042</link><guid isPermaLink="false">urn:hackerpapers:mention:1607.01341:14755042</guid><pubDate>Wed, 12 Jul 2017 18:16:20 GMT</pubDate><description>&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt; Why not move to proof of stake? &amp;gt;&amp;gt; Because it doesn&amp;#x27;t make sense. If a chain, on which a token exists, needs securing, you can&amp;#x27;t use that chain&amp;#x27;s token to secure itself. I mean I&amp;#x27;m not entirely sure what this argument is based on? In addition to existing proof of stake systems which have been running for years now, there exist several papers with rigorous formal proofs. Including Turing Award winner Silvio Micali&amp;#x27;s algorand. Refute his paper. You will became very famous overnight. https://arxiv.org/abs/1607.01341 &amp;gt; Mining has huge energy requirements as shown by the article. &amp;gt;&amp;gt; Mining has…&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1607.01341/"&gt;Paper and discussion history&lt;/a&gt;. A mention is not an endorsement.&lt;/p&gt;</description><category>cs.CR</category></item><item><title>Algorand — mentioned by peercoin</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=14754119</link><guid isPermaLink="false">urn:hackerpapers:mention:1607.01341:14754119</guid><pubDate>Wed, 12 Jul 2017 16:49:34 GMT</pubDate><description>&lt;p&gt;Why not move to proof of stake? Proof of Work mining used in bitcon to secure the network as originally proposed in Nakomoto&amp;#x27;s paper has huge energy requirements. The result is large energy hungry mines as shown by the article. In addition, there is a centralization of governance by the miners. One such example of a long running proof of stake is Peercoin. Peercoin is a legit energy-efficient contender to Bitcoin. It&amp;#x27;s one of the first publicly known implementations of proof of stake has been around for close to 5 years now. Peercoin is energy-efficient and runs on raspberry pis. It&amp;#x27;s been…&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1607.01341/"&gt;Paper and discussion history&lt;/a&gt;. A mention is not an endorsement.&lt;/p&gt;</description><category>cs.CR</category></item><item><title>Algorand — mentioned by jude-</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=14064998</link><guid isPermaLink="false">urn:hackerpapers:mention:1607.01341:14064998</guid><pubDate>Sat, 08 Apr 2017 02:46:33 GMT</pubDate><description>&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt; This is usually considered too expensive in the context of non-coin/-blockchain p2p networks because you want nodes to be able to run on embedded and other resource-constrained devices. The O(log n) node state and bootstrap cost limits are quite important. Otherwise it would be akin to asking every mobile phone to keep up to date with the full BGP route set. Funny you should mention BGP. We have been approached by researchers at Princeton who are interested in doing something like that, using Blockstack (but to be fair, they&amp;#x27;re more interested in giving each home router a copy of the global…&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1607.01341/"&gt;Paper and discussion history&lt;/a&gt;. A mention is not an endorsement.&lt;/p&gt;</description><category>cs.CR</category></item><item><title>Algorand — HN submission</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12048606</link><guid isPermaLink="false">urn:hackerpapers:submission:1607.01341:12048606</guid><pubDate>Thu, 07 Jul 2016 11:17:16 GMT</pubDate><description>&lt;p&gt;ALGORAND: The Efficient and Democratic Ledger (by Silvio Micali)&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;2 points; 0 discussion replies on HN. &lt;a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1607.01341/"&gt;Paper and source history&lt;/a&gt;. A submission is not an endorsement.&lt;/p&gt;</description><category>cs.CR</category></item></channel></rss>
