Fansmitter: Acoustic Data Exfiltration from (Speakerless) Air-Gapped Computers · HackerPapers discussions

Fansmitter: Acoustic Data Exfiltration from (Speakerless) Air-Gapped Computers — mentioned by Y_Y

Sat, 06 Dec 2025 16:04:09 GMT

just fan noise? https://arxiv.org/abs/1606.05915 Any signal that you can modulate can be an exfiltration channel, and fan noise is no different.

Paper and discussion history. A mention is not an endorsement.

Fansmitter: Acoustic Data Exfiltration from (Speakerless) Air-Gapped Computers — mentioned by khafra

Tue, 22 Jul 2025 10:57:20 GMT

That's not a comic, and it's not artificial superintelligence: https://arxiv.org/abs/1606.05915 Whatever AI comes up with by 2030 is going to be much more clever and unexpected.

Paper and discussion history. A mention is not an endorsement.

Fansmitter: Acoustic Data Exfiltration from (Speakerless) Air-Gapped Computers — mentioned by ech

Sun, 30 Jul 2017 13:10:15 GMT

that is not what an air gap is. if at any time there is an exchange of data between the air gapped hosts/network and a non air gapped one, there is no air gap anymore. and yes, that includes an analyst taking a sample to an internet-connected host. side channel exfiltration techniques like "fansmitter"[1] and "diskfiltration"[2] or the well known TEMPEST attacks are more interesting challenges in air gapped designs than relying on a very basic security boundary violation. (and solved in very much the same way, by having the secure terminals be as dumb as bricks as possible, with extremely…

Paper and discussion history. A mention is not an endorsement.

Fansmitter: Acoustic Data Exfiltration from (Speakerless) Air-Gapped Computers — HN submission

Fri, 24 Jun 2016 13:57:15 GMT

Fansmitter: Acoustic Data Exfiltration from Speakerless Air-Gapped Computers

60 points; 24 discussion replies on HN. Paper and source history. A submission is not an endorsement.