arXiv:1605.08805cs.CR
Fingerprintability of WebRTC
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Abstract
We examine WebRTC's suitability as a means of Internet censorship circumvention. WebRTC is a framework and suite of protocols for peer-to-peer communication between web browsers. We analyze the implementation differences in instantiations of WebRTC that make it possible to "fingerprint" implementations--potentially distinguishing circumvention-related uses from ordinary ones. This question is relevant to Snowflake, an upcoming circumvention system that uses WebRTC to turn web browsers into temporary peer-to-peer proxies. We conduct a manual analysis of WebRTC-using applications in order to map the space of distinguishing implementation features. We run a fingerprinting script on a day's worth of network traffic in order to quantify WebRTC's prevalence and diversity. Throughout, we find pitfalls that indicate that resisting fingerprinting in WebRTC is likely to be non-trivial.
You might be interested in looking at Snowflake[0], which does something similar. This paper[1] too; that being said, the parrot is dead. Cool project! [0] Snowflake - https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/Snowflake [1] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1605.08805.pdf
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