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<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Estimating the cost of generic quantum pre-image attacks on SHA-2 and SHA-3 · HackerPapers discussions</title><link>https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1603.09383/</link><description>Collected HN comments and submissions linking this paper.</description><language>en</language><lastBuildDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 11:16:22 GMT</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1603.09383/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" /><item><title>Estimating the cost of generic quantum pre-image attacks on SHA-2 and SHA-3 — mentioned by charleslmunger</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=16457607</link><guid isPermaLink="false">urn:hackerpapers:mention:1603.09383:16457607</guid><pubDate>Sun, 25 Feb 2018 07:05:45 GMT</pubDate><description>&lt;p&gt;Grover&amp;#x27;s algorithm means you need to double the length of your hashes, but that hardly puts sha-512 in danger. Even sha-256 is safer than a naive calculation would suggest: https://arxiv.org/pdf/1603.09383&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1603.09383/"&gt;Paper and discussion history&lt;/a&gt;. A mention is not an endorsement.&lt;/p&gt;</description><category>quant-ph</category></item></channel></rss>
