Stable Matching Mechanisms are Not Obviously Strategy-Proof — mentioned by smallnamespace

Wed, 23 May 2018 00:07:44 GMT

Thanks for taking the time to reply in depth. I think this is a situation with a bit of nuance, and it's possible to really endlessly argue about the issue if we don't tie down the definitions a bit. > You should also consider that if we got each others’ best preference, this is a sign of a broken system, because we could have clearly been assigned to our first choices in the first place. So in my view, the exchange should be allowed, and then the system fixed so that such situations are not possible. The thing is that matching systems have been studied for a long time and there is a very…

Paper and discussion history. A mention is not an endorsement.

Stable Matching Mechanisms are Not Obviously Strategy-Proof · HackerPapers discussions

Stable Matching Mechanisms are Not Obviously Strategy-Proof — mentioned by smallnamespace