Measuring and mitigating AS-level adversaries against Tor · HackerPapers discussionshttps://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1505.05173/Collected HN comments and submissions linking this paper.enMon, 02 Nov 2026 11:16:22 GMTMeasuring and mitigating AS-level adversaries against Tor — mentioned by otoburbhttps://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=9586259urn:hackerpapers:mention:1505.05173:9586259Fri, 22 May 2015 01:33:07 GMT<p>&gt;&gt;Astoria [is] both most effective and most usable when at its highest security level, the researchers say, so &quot;Astoria is a usable substitute for the vanilla Tor client only in scenarios where security is a high priority.&quot; I&#x27;m still working through the research paper[1] linked at the end of the article, but if Astoria is as good as described, wouldn&#x27;t Tor either adopt the same node selection policies, or people shift over to Astoria wholesale? [1] http://arxiv.org/pdf/1505.05173.pdf EDIT: From the paper, quotes below provide much clearer context for the quote in the article: &quot;From our…</p><p><a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1505.05173/">Paper and discussion history</a>. A mention is not an endorsement.</p>cs.CR