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<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>The Miner's Dilemma · HackerPapers discussions</title><link>https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1411.7099/</link><description>Collected HN comments and submissions linking this paper.</description><language>en</language><lastBuildDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 11:16:22 GMT</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1411.7099/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" /><item><title>The Miner's Dilemma — mentioned by phlip9</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=17175912</link><guid isPermaLink="false">urn:hackerpapers:mention:1411.7099:17175912</guid><pubDate>Tue, 29 May 2018 01:59:00 GMT</pubDate><description>&lt;p&gt;Selfish/stubborn mining isn&amp;#x27;t applicable here, since the double spender has to fork and withhold all blocks from the point where their honest transaction is included in a block until the victim sends them the goods/exchange withdrawal/whatever, at which point they need to eventually mine a longer chain and reveal. At ~50% hash power and with a victim who waits &amp;lt;10 confirmations you still only have a ~1/2+o(1) probability of mining a longer private chain. The point is if you can maintain the 50% long enough, you can expect to eventually have the longer chain. You can also have &amp;lt;50% hash power…&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1411.7099/"&gt;Paper and discussion history&lt;/a&gt;. A mention is not an endorsement.&lt;/p&gt;</description><category>cs.CR</category></item></channel></rss>
