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<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Robust Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma: Program Equilibrium via Provability Logic · HackerPapers discussions</title><link>https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1401.5577/</link><description>Collected HN comments and submissions linking this paper.</description><language>en</language><lastBuildDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 11:16:22 GMT</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1401.5577/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" /><item><title>Robust Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma: Program Equilibrium via Provability Logic — mentioned by benlivengood</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46437327</link><guid isPermaLink="false">urn:hackerpapers:mention:1401.5577:46437327</guid><pubDate>Tue, 30 Dec 2025 20:00:23 GMT</pubDate><description>&lt;p&gt;With an optimal way of determining fair splitting of gains like Shapley value[0] you can cooperate or defect with a probability that maximizes other participants expected value when everyone act fairly. The ultimatum game is the simplest example; N dollars of prize to split, N/2 is fair, accept with probability M / (N /2) where M is what&amp;#x27;s offered to you; the opponents maximum expected value comes from offering N/2; trying to offer less (or more) results in expected value to them &amp;lt; N/2. Trust can be built out of clearly describing how you&amp;#x27;ll respond in your own best interests in ways that…&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1401.5577/"&gt;Paper and discussion history&lt;/a&gt;. A mention is not an endorsement.&lt;/p&gt;</description><category>cs.GT</category></item><item><title>Robust Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma: Program Equilibrium via Provability Logic — mentioned by dash2</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=31587213</link><guid isPermaLink="false">urn:hackerpapers:mention:1401.5577:31587213</guid><pubDate>Wed, 01 Jun 2022 19:59:57 GMT</pubDate><description>&lt;p&gt;This is quite fun. From a very different starting point, the idea of Team Reasoning is another non-standard way of thinking about rationality, which also starts from the idea of &amp;quot;shared commitments&amp;quot;: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1000200309853874... The paper underlying this discussion is here, by the way, and Eliezer Yudkowsky is an author: https://arxiv.org/abs/1401.5577&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1401.5577/"&gt;Paper and discussion history&lt;/a&gt;. A mention is not an endorsement.&lt;/p&gt;</description><category>cs.GT</category></item><item><title>Robust Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma: Program Equilibrium via Provability Logic — mentioned by psyc</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30880226</link><guid isPermaLink="false">urn:hackerpapers:mention:1401.5577:30880226</guid><pubDate>Fri, 01 Apr 2022 16:41:58 GMT</pubDate><description>&lt;p&gt;You keep hammering on with the same lazy slander. Yudkowsky was well known long before he wrote the popular Harry Potter fanfic, which incidentally is pedagogical / allegorical. Because his main roles are teacher and philosopher, and philosophers do that. Here&amp;#x27;s a sampling of his non-fiction writing: https://www.lesswrong.com/tag/sequences https://intelligence.org/files/EthicsofAI.pdf https://arxiv.org/abs/1710.05060 https://intelligence.org/files/AlignmentMachineLearning.pdf https://arxiv.org/abs/1401.5577 https://arxiv.org/abs/1401.5577 https://intelligence.org/files/Corrigibility.pdf…&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1401.5577/"&gt;Paper and discussion history&lt;/a&gt;. A mention is not an endorsement.&lt;/p&gt;</description><category>cs.GT</category></item><item><title>Robust Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma: Program Equilibrium via Provability Logic — mentioned by Jach</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=18982933</link><guid isPermaLink="false">urn:hackerpapers:mention:1401.5577:18982933</guid><pubDate>Wed, 23 Jan 2019 21:04:17 GMT</pubDate><description>&lt;p&gt;Read Eliezer himself, 4 years ago: https://www.reddit.com/r/xkcd/comments/2myg86/xkcd_1450_aibo... The &amp;quot;meat&amp;quot; of interest here for those too lazy to click (I encourage people click through, though, really, and maybe even take a glance at https://arxiv.org/abs/1401.5577) is probably this long parenthetical: &amp;gt; (But taking Roko&amp;#x27;s premises at face value, his idea would zap people as soon as they read it. Which - keeping in mind that at the time I had absolutely no idea this would all blow up the way it did - caused me to yell quite loudly at Roko for violating ethics given his own premises, I…&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1401.5577/"&gt;Paper and discussion history&lt;/a&gt;. A mention is not an endorsement.&lt;/p&gt;</description><category>cs.GT</category></item><item><title>Robust Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma: Program Equilibrium via Provability Logic — mentioned by Eliezer</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=9321984</link><guid isPermaLink="false">urn:hackerpapers:mention:1401.5577:9321984</guid><pubDate>Sat, 04 Apr 2015 19:58:48 GMT</pubDate><description>&lt;p&gt;This is a relatively old manuscript, and I would recommend instead reading, or at least first reading: * http://intelligence.org/files/ProblemClassDominance.pdf * http://arxiv.org/abs/1401.5577 (The original TDT manuscript occurred via pleas for &amp;#x27;something, anything to be published&amp;#x27; that were satisfied by cleaning up an unfinished book draft and publishing it as-was.)&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1401.5577/"&gt;Paper and discussion history&lt;/a&gt;. A mention is not an endorsement.&lt;/p&gt;</description><category>cs.GT</category></item><item><title>Robust Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma: Program Equilibrium via Provability Logic — mentioned by Eliezer</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=9321973</link><guid isPermaLink="false">urn:hackerpapers:mention:1401.5577:9321973</guid><pubDate>Sat, 04 Apr 2015 19:56:41 GMT</pubDate><description>&lt;p&gt;http://arxiv.org/abs/1401.5577&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1401.5577/"&gt;Paper and discussion history&lt;/a&gt;. A mention is not an endorsement.&lt;/p&gt;</description><category>cs.GT</category></item><item><title>Robust Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma: Program Equilibrium via Provability Logic — HN submission</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=8051618</link><guid isPermaLink="false">urn:hackerpapers:submission:1401.5577:8051618</guid><pubDate>Fri, 18 Jul 2014 04:11:55 GMT</pubDate><description>&lt;p&gt;Robust Cooperation in the Prisoner&amp;#x27;s Dilemma&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;3 points; 0 discussion replies on HN. &lt;a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1401.5577/"&gt;Paper and source history&lt;/a&gt;. A submission is not an endorsement.&lt;/p&gt;</description><category>cs.GT</category></item></channel></rss>
