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<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>An Extension of Cook's Elastic Cipher · HackerPapers discussions</title><link>https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1310.4050/</link><description>Collected HN comments and submissions linking this paper.</description><language>en</language><lastBuildDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 11:16:22 GMT</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1310.4050/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" /><item><title>An Extension of Cook's Elastic Cipher — mentioned by eternaleye</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=15495991</link><guid isPermaLink="false">urn:hackerpapers:mention:1310.4050:15495991</guid><pubDate>Wed, 18 Oct 2017 00:07:16 GMT</pubDate><description>&lt;p&gt;From everything I&amp;#x27;ve seen, the security requirements of &amp;quot;true&amp;quot; RAE are exactly SPRP - that&amp;#x27;s certainly how Rogaway has framed it. To the best of my knowledge, that&amp;#x27;s why he designed AEZ under the encode-then-encipher paradigm - encode the plaintext with \tau trailing zero bits, then encipher it with (what is intended to be) a length-preserving SPRP. Being an SPRP, the inverse is also a PRP, and thus any adulteration of the ciphertext results in a pseudorandom decryption, preventing RUP (and causing the trailing zeroes to fail to validate). Constructing the SPRP then becomes the interesting…&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1310.4050/"&gt;Paper and discussion history&lt;/a&gt;. A mention is not an endorsement.&lt;/p&gt;</description><category>cs.IT</category></item></channel></rss>
