Physical key-protected one-time pad · HackerPapers discussions

Physical key-protected one-time pad — HN submission

Tue, 21 May 2013 09:54:23 GMT

Physical key-protected one-time pad

1 point; 0 discussion replies on HN. Paper and source history. A submission is not an endorsement.

Physical key-protected one-time pad — mentioned by ReidZB

Tue, 21 May 2013 04:29:27 GMT

I'm not sure about the handling of the glass. The paper [1] gives all of the specific materials used in the experiment, but it doesn't say anything about handling them and I don't know enough about the area to be able to intelligently comment... The paper also mentions that the randomness they are using passes the Diehard and NIST randomness tests, so it appears they are pretty random. Apparently, though, they have to sacrifice some of the bits in order to ensure that! It references "Supplements" E and F, saying they include more details, but they're not included in the arXiv paper. Of…

Paper and discussion history. A mention is not an endorsement.

Physical key-protected one-time pad — mentioned by ReidZB

Tue, 21 May 2013 03:48:01 GMT

The original paper [1] is much clearer about the actual algorithm. The below is pretty much pulled straight from it, although I simplify it slightly (by assuming one pattern, etc.) First, Alice and Bob decide on a pattern P. Then they each compute a key K(A) and K(B) using the pattern P by shining P through their slab. Then, they publicly publish P and K(A) ⊕ K(B). (Apologies for the lack of good mathematical notation, but HN is not a great medium for such.) Because P, K(A), and K(B) are all random, the attacker learns no useful information from these two published items. Now, for Alice to…

Paper and discussion history. A mention is not an endorsement.