https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1210.7085/Collected HN comments and submissions linking this paper.enMon, 02 Nov 2026 11:16:22 GMThttps://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13364125urn:hackerpapers:mention:1210.7085:13364125Tue, 10 Jan 2017 11:33:42 GMT<p>arXiv:1210.7085: &quot;Stability and robustness analysis of cooperation cycles driven by destructive agents in finite populations&quot; (2012) https://arxiv.org/abs/1210.7085 Abstract: &quot;The emergence and promotion of cooperation are two of the main issues in evolutionary game theory, as cooperation is amenable to exploitation by defectors, which take advantage of cooperative individuals at no cost, dooming them to extinction. It has been recently shown that the existence of purely destructive agents (termed jokers) acting on the common enterprises (public goods games) can induce stable limit cycles…</p><p><a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1210.7085/">Paper and discussion history</a>. A mention is not an endorsement.</p>physics.soc-ph