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<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Information theoretic security by the laws of classical physics · HackerPapers discussions</title><link>https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1206.2534/</link><description>Collected HN comments and submissions linking this paper.</description><language>en</language><lastBuildDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 11:16:22 GMT</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1206.2534/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" /><item><title>Information theoretic security by the laws of classical physics — mentioned by dhx</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=4111788</link><guid isPermaLink="false">urn:hackerpapers:mention:1206.2534:4111788</guid><pubDate>Thu, 14 Jun 2012 15:34:17 GMT</pubDate><description>&lt;p&gt;After reading through the paper[1] it appears that the only security afforded is an ability to detect energy fluctuations caused by a MITM attacker? A public channel is then assumed to exist to allow both parties to broadcast the monitored energy levels to each other for comparison (evidently over a high bandwidth link and with low latency). A further assumption appears to be made that an attacker is unable to perform a MITM attack on the public broadcast link. I am naturally sceptical of research of this nature that does not mention: * practical implementation issues such as the required…&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1206.2534/"&gt;Paper and discussion history&lt;/a&gt;. A mention is not an endorsement.&lt;/p&gt;</description><category>cs.ET</category></item></channel></rss>
