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<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Memory Attacks on Device-Independent Quantum Cryptography · HackerPapers discussions</title><link>https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1201.4407/</link><description>Collected HN comments and submissions linking this paper.</description><language>en</language><lastBuildDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 11:16:22 GMT</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1201.4407/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" /><item><title>Memory Attacks on Device-Independent Quantum Cryptography — mentioned by tjoff</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=3510075</link><guid isPermaLink="false">urn:hackerpapers:mention:1201.4407:3510075</guid><pubDate>Wed, 25 Jan 2012 15:40:35 GMT</pubDate><description>&lt;p&gt;Despite the fact that this same &amp;quot;serious flaw&amp;quot; exists with classical cryptography devices, only worse (since the quantum attack doesn&amp;#x27;t reveal plaintext A until B is sent). How would you do this with classical cryptography? Isn&amp;#x27;t the point about this particular flaw that it is pretty much undetectable (other than inspecting the hardware itself (which is outside the scope of the article that treats it as a black box)). If the same were to be implemented on classical cryptography it would be comparatively trivial to detect if someone tried to sneak in an old message interleaved with a new…&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1201.4407/"&gt;Paper and discussion history&lt;/a&gt;. A mention is not an endorsement.&lt;/p&gt;</description><category>quant-ph</category></item></channel></rss>
