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<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Guildenstern and Rosencrantz in Quantumland -- A Reply to Adrian Kent · HackerPapers discussions</title><link>https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1111.2563/</link><description>Collected HN comments and submissions linking this paper.</description><language>en</language><lastBuildDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 11:16:22 GMT</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1111.2563/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" /><item><title>Guildenstern and Rosencrantz in Quantumland -- A Reply to Adrian Kent — mentioned by akvadrako</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13409142</link><guid isPermaLink="false">urn:hackerpapers:mention:1111.2563:13409142</guid><pubDate>Mon, 16 Jan 2017 10:08:23 GMT</pubDate><description>&lt;p&gt;I have read lots of critiques about the Born rule derivations but I&amp;#x27;ve missed this one. Thanks for the pointer. He is only attacking one attempt, the decision-theoretic one. I have trouble finding his point in this paper because it&amp;#x27;s so rambling but he seems to be saying: &amp;gt; It seems prima facie surprising to claim that mathematical analysis could show that Born-weight mean utilitarianism, or any other strategy, is the unique rational way of optimizing the welfare of one’s own, and other people’s, many future selves in a multiverse. Okay, sure - but it&amp;#x27;s also just as ridiculous to say that you…&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1111.2563/"&gt;Paper and discussion history&lt;/a&gt;. A mention is not an endorsement.&lt;/p&gt;</description><category>quant-ph</category></item></channel></rss>
