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<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Inapproximability of NP-Complete Variants of Nash Equilibrium · HackerPapers discussions</title><link>https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1104.3760/</link><description>Collected HN comments and submissions linking this paper.</description><language>en</language><lastBuildDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 11:16:22 GMT</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1104.3760/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" /><item><title>Inapproximability of NP-Complete Variants of Nash Equilibrium — mentioned by ericjang</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=24845106</link><guid isPermaLink="false">urn:hackerpapers:mention:1104.3760:24845106</guid><pubDate>Wed, 21 Oct 2020 05:50:35 GMT</pubDate><description>&lt;p&gt;The report, while a fun thought exercise for any aspiring academic, is not a novel insight, and is obviously untrue for most definitions of market efficiency. If we are going to play the academic one-upmanship game, a more general result that &amp;quot;best&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;multiple&amp;quot; N-player Nash Equilibria for N &amp;gt; 2 is already NP-hard. The implication of an efficient market would be if every player had a polynomial-time algorithm to solve the NP-hard problem, ergo P=NP. [1] https://people.csail.mit.edu/costis/simplified.pdf [2] https://www.quantamagazine.org/in-game-theory-no-clear-path-... [3]…&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1104.3760/"&gt;Paper and discussion history&lt;/a&gt;. A mention is not an endorsement.&lt;/p&gt;</description><category>cs.CC</category></item></channel></rss>
