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<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Fully Countering Trusting Trust through Diverse Double-Compiling · HackerPapers discussions</title><link>https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1004.5534/</link><description>Collected HN comments and submissions linking this paper.</description><language>en</language><lastBuildDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 11:16:22 GMT</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1004.5534/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" /><item><title>Fully Countering Trusting Trust through Diverse Double-Compiling — mentioned by laurenth</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47626494</link><guid isPermaLink="false">urn:hackerpapers:mention:1004.5534:47626494</guid><pubDate>Fri, 03 Apr 2026 13:33:16 GMT</pubDate><description>&lt;p&gt;A shell is almost always used to setup the bootstrap environment, so the dependency on a shell is more or less always there. Otherwise, something special with POSIX shell is its large number of independent implementations, making it the ideal starting point for diverse double-compilation (https://arxiv.org/abs/1004.5534). The idea is to bootstrap a toolchain from multiple compilers (shells in this case), and the result compared to verify that no shell introduced a trusting trust attack.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1004.5534/"&gt;Paper and discussion history&lt;/a&gt;. A mention is not an endorsement.&lt;/p&gt;</description><category>cs.CR</category></item><item><title>Fully Countering Trusting Trust through Diverse Double-Compiling — mentioned by vlovich123</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47502862</link><guid isPermaLink="false">urn:hackerpapers:mention:1004.5534:47502862</guid><pubDate>Tue, 24 Mar 2026 14:09:12 GMT</pubDate><description>&lt;p&gt;Reflect in what way? The primary focus of that talk is that it’s possible to infect the binary of a compiler in a way that source analysis won’t reveal and the binary self replicates the vulnerability into other binaries it generates. Thankfully that particular problem was “solved” a while back [1] even if not yet implemented widely. However, the broader idea of supply chain attacks remains challenging and AI doesn’t really matter in terms of how you should treat it. For example, the xz-utils back door in the build system to attack OpenSSH on many popular distros that patched it to depend on…&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1004.5534/"&gt;Paper and discussion history&lt;/a&gt;. A mention is not an endorsement.&lt;/p&gt;</description><category>cs.CR</category></item><item><title>Fully Countering Trusting Trust through Diverse Double-Compiling — HN submission</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=39875464</link><guid isPermaLink="false">urn:hackerpapers:submission:1004.5534:39875464</guid><pubDate>Sat, 30 Mar 2024 14:56:50 GMT</pubDate><description>&lt;p&gt;Fully countering trusting trust through diverse double-compiling (2005)&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;9 points; 1 discussion reply on HN. &lt;a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1004.5534/"&gt;Paper and source history&lt;/a&gt;. A submission is not an endorsement.&lt;/p&gt;</description><category>cs.CR</category></item><item><title>Fully Countering Trusting Trust through Diverse Double-Compiling — mentioned by dllthomas</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=15825268</link><guid isPermaLink="false">urn:hackerpapers:mention:1004.5534:15825268</guid><pubDate>Fri, 01 Dec 2017 17:10:43 GMT</pubDate><description>&lt;p&gt;See David Wheeler&amp;#x27;s work on &amp;quot;Diverse Double Compiling&amp;quot;. What the parent describes seems to be similar. https://arxiv.org/abs/1004.5534&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/1004.5534/"&gt;Paper and discussion history&lt;/a&gt;. A mention is not an endorsement.&lt;/p&gt;</description><category>cs.CR</category></item></channel></rss>
