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<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>A Complete Theory of Everything (will be subjective) · HackerPapers discussions</title><link>https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/0912.5434/</link><description>Collected HN comments and submissions linking this paper.</description><language>en</language><lastBuildDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 11:16:22 GMT</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/0912.5434/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" /><item><title>A Complete Theory of Everything (will be subjective) — mentioned by chriswarbo</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=17581426</link><guid isPermaLink="false">urn:hackerpapers:mention:0912.5434:17581426</guid><pubDate>Sat, 21 Jul 2018 09:37:07 GMT</pubDate><description>&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt; Honestly I haven&amp;#x27;t seen attempts at making this process more rigorous, when applied to physics. Marcus Hutter has expressed this idea quite well ( https://arxiv.org/pdf/0912.5434 ) arguing that (a) smaller/simpler theories have more predictive power and (b) the &amp;quot;size&amp;quot; of a theory includes the complexity of its equations and the parameters needed to specify some result. The latter is important because some theories trade off between these two: e.g. a multiverse theory might have simple equations (&amp;quot;every possibility happens somewhere&amp;quot;) but require very precise &amp;quot;coordinates&amp;quot; to pin-point the…&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/0912.5434/"&gt;Paper and discussion history&lt;/a&gt;. A mention is not an endorsement.&lt;/p&gt;</description><category>cs.IT</category></item><item><title>A Complete Theory of Everything (will be subjective) — mentioned by chriswarbo</title><link>https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=10547101</link><guid isPermaLink="false">urn:hackerpapers:mention:0912.5434:10547101</guid><pubDate>Wed, 11 Nov 2015 15:31:27 GMT</pubDate><description>&lt;p&gt;One thing to keep in mind with ideas like the Mathematical Universe Hypothesis is their predictive power. Once a &amp;quot;theory of everything&amp;quot; describes what could have been as well as what is, you end up needing another theory to distinguish between the two [1]. For example, Champernowne&amp;#x27;s constant contains every number in its decimal expansion, and hence contains a complete description of our universe, all of the true laws of Physics and the outcome of every random quantum effect. However, it&amp;#x27;s not a very satisfactory &amp;quot;theory of everything&amp;quot;, since it makes no predictions. (Note that I could have…&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://hackerpaper.kaipfister.de/p/0912.5434/"&gt;Paper and discussion history&lt;/a&gt;. A mention is not an endorsement.&lt;/p&gt;</description><category>cs.IT</category></item></channel></rss>
